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ABSTRACT 
 
In the current environment of military operations requesting faster delivery 
schedules to counter insurgent tactics, the engineering team often searches for how to 
quickly deliver the “80% solution”, typically in 6-12 months. These are labeled rapid 
development projects.  A content analysis of best practices in commercial product 
development literature, where time to market is often a driving factor, was accomplished 
showing varying emphasis of systems engineering technical and technical management 
processes. Technical Planning, Stakeholders Requirements Development, and Architecture 
Design were identified as important processes. This analysis confirms preconceived notions 
of “plan upfront and early” by emphasizing the SE processes of Stakeholder Requirements 
Definition, Architecture Design and Technical Planning. A purposive sampling of AFRL 
rapid development program managers and engineers was conducted to identify important 
SE processes and compared to the literature content analysis. The results of this sampling 
did not strongly emphasize one process over another however Architecture Design, 
Implementation scored higher among Technical Processes. Decision Analysis, Technical 
Planning, Technical Assessment and Data Management scored slightly higher among 
Technical Management Processes. Anecdotal evidence also emphasized iterating prototype 
designs based on early customer feedback, focusing mostly on critical risks and holding 
more reviews early in a project schedule until a trust in the team is built.
v 
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RAPID DEVELOPMENT: A CONTENT ANALYSIS COMPARISON OF 
LITERATURE AND PURPOSIVE SAMPLING OF AFRL RAPID REACTION 
PROJECTS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The accelerated pace of change in the tactics, techniques and procedures used by adversaries of the 
United States has heightened the need for a rapid response to new threats. Fielding systems in response to urgent 
operational needs over the last half decade has revealed the DoD lacks the ability to rapidly field new capabilities 
for the warfighter in a systematic and effective way. – Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs, July 2009 
 
 
Background 
 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition system is chartered with providing 
effective, affordable, and timely systems to our operational forces (DoD 5000.01). From 
Los Angeles-class submarines to the M1A1 Abrams tank to the F-22 Raptor, the DoD has 
produced the most technologically advanced weapon systems ever made. With a workforce 
of 130,000 (OSD/AT&L, 2010), the acquisition community delivers the tools enabling our 
military to perform the missions they are tasked to accomplish. 
The process by which we develop those warfighting tools has continually evolved 
to meet the changing times. A RAND study of acquisition reform (Hanks et al, 2005) lists 
major events in acquisition reform as shown in Table 1, to which this author has modified 
for brevity and included recent revisions to the DoD 5000 series of instruction that guides 
the execution of programs.  
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Table 1. Acquisition Reform Milestones 
 
Date Major Acquisition Event 
1972 Commission on Government Procurement 
1974 Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act 
1982 Executive Order 12352 (established the FAR and directed procurement reforms) 
1983 Grace Commission 
1983 Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act 
1984 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
1985 Department of Defense Procurement Reform Act 
1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (“Goldwater-Nichols Act”) 
1986 Packard Commission 
1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
1993 Acquisition Law Advisory Panel 
1993 Government Performance and Results Act 
1994 Secretary of Defense Perry‟s “Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change” 
1994 DUSD for Acquisition Reform Office first established 
1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) 
1995 Commission on Defense Roles and Missions (CORM) 
1996 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
1996 Clinger-Cohen Act 
1997 Defense Reform Act 
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review #1, issued May 1997 (called for by FY95 NDAA) 
1998 Acquisition Results Act 
2001 DoD 5000 rewrite 
2007 DoD 5000.01 Revised 
2008 DoD 5000.02 Revised 
2009 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) 
 
Currently, the United States is challenged in responding to new emerging threats, 
specifically in the proliferation of the improvised explosive device (IED). To complicate 
this threat, the enemy uses readily available commercial items and various explosive 
materials to build IEDs, combat tests hundreds of combinations of these devices aided by 
blending into the local population and by the covert nature of the devices, and 
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communicates lessons learned and success stories across shadow websites on the Internet 
(JIEDDO, 2009).  
The impact of our enemies‟ ability to produce weapon systems quicker, cheaper 
and within reach of our forces has lead to numerous studies on how to rapidly field new 
capabilities to the warfighter (DSB 2007, 2009; GAO 2010; Solomon, 2008). Anecdotal 
reviews of prior wartime acquisition offer the insight that it is possible to respond to 
emerging threats in a responsive manner to give our warfighters the advantage. Radar 
stations developed before and during WWII provided the British and Americans early 
warning for incoming German bombers (Brown, 1999). The Culin Hedgerow Cutter was 
adapted from steel obstacles (originally emplaced by the German army) and attached to the 
front of Sherman tanks allowing the breaching of hedgerows to counter German 
emplacements in confined fields in the taking of the French town of St. Lo (Guttman, 
1998). Electronic countermeasures were implemented in F-100, F-105 and F-4 Wild 
Weasel squadrons to locate and negate surface-to-air (SAM) site threats during Vietnam 
(Hewitt, 1992). The United States military has a history of quickly implemented responses 
to emerging threats. 
In fact, there are current efforts to provide our warfighters with timely solutions to 
their needs. The Defense Science Board identified no less than 20 groups dedicated to such 
a task (DSB, 2009). These organizations were found at many levels from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense to the Major Commands (MAJCOMs) in the services to the 
Combatant Commands (COCOMs) themselves. Some were focused on a specific threat or 
capability, like the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) or the Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
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Task Forces, while others sought a way to handle the broader rapid fielding process, like 
the Rapid Reaction Technology Office or the Army Rapid Equipping Force. 
Within the Air Force, the future technology capabilities are discovered, developed 
and delivered in the Air Force Research Laboratory. AFRL has aligned its programs along 
three Core Processes, each focused on the different stages from science studies to 
technology insertion. Core Process 3 (CP3) addresses the immediate needs requested by the 
warfighter and delivers a demonstration prototype within “12 months or less” (AFRL 
Instruction 90-104, Vol 3). While not fully matured along standard acquisition 
requirements, the prototype is expected to be used in the field upon completion of a 
successful demonstration. During the development effort, transition partners identify paths 
to insert the capability into programs of record, if desired. 
Recently, AFRL issued an instruction for executing the CP3 mission. AFRLI 90-
104, Vol 3, lays out general organization strategies such as forming “rapid reaction teams” 
and iNodes by matrixing subject matter experts from across AFRL, industry and academia 
to solve urgent needs. General guidance to meet timelines and frequent process owner 
updates combined with organizational “hard chargers” ensure prototypes are delivered on 
time. Currently there is no collection of lessons learned or best practices that would assist a 
program manager in creating a development strategy on short timeframes.   
Previous studies have investigated 1) how DoD rapid development/ rapid 
acquisition organizations use innovation to meet urgent needs (Behm et al, 2009) and 2) 
how AFRL implements a systems engineering approach across all its programs to 
effectively deliver products to the acquisition community (Solomon, 2008). This effort will 
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synthesize the two ideas to identify the systems engineering practices necessary for 
successful rapid development efforts within AFRL.  
Problem Statement and Objective 
 
Complex weapon systems require a level of organization to communicate designs, 
establish milestones and lay out a schedule. The field of systems engineering has developed 
a framework with a track record of helping programs stay on cost and on time (Honour, 
2004). However, systems engineering (SE) is perceived in the science and technology 
(S&T) culture of AFRL as non-value added (Behm et al, 2009; Doyle, 2008). However, if a 
traditional SE approach can be tailored and validated for rapid development projects, this 
would be an approach well suited to meet user expectations by delivering quality products 
along aggressive schedules. The objective is to develop such a framework through 
literature review and validate by studying recent rapid development efforts in AFRL.  
Research questions 
 
1. What accepted activities in rapid development literature and practice correlate to 
Defense Acquisition SE activities? 
2. What SE activities were emphasized by AFRL program managers, lead engineers 
and key personnel on recent rapid development projects? 
3. How does the model reflecting the literature compare to the model found in AFRL 
rapid development projects? 
Methodology 
 
A review of literature will identify industry best practices for rapid development 
and systems engineering. Out of this review, a framework of key practices for rapid 
development will be derived from a comparison of current DoD suggested practices for 
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systems engineering. A purposive sampling of AFRL rapid reaction team members will 
identify key SE activities utilized in recent projects and will be compared to the model 
formed by the literature study. Finally, a recommendation of best practices will be crafted 
for future AFRL CP3 projects conveyed in draft language for updates to the current AFRL 
Instruction 90-104, Volume 3, “AFRL Core Process 3, Innovative Solutions to Near-Term 
Needs”. 
Summary 
 
This chapter identified the need for rapid development and current challenges faced 
by the DoD. AFRL has instituted Core Process 3 to handle rapid development projects to 
meet urgent needs of the warfighter. Instituting best practices of successful rapid 
development projects within AFRL identified by literature review and validated with case 
studies will increase the success of CP3 projects. Chapter 2 will provide a literature review 
of the DoD‟s acquisition system, its efforts to meet urgent warfighter needs, and best 
practices of rapid development approaches in the academic and business literature. Chapter 
3 will provide the methodology to determine a tailored systems engineering approach for 
CP3 projects within AFRL. Chapter 4 will compare the proposed framework with the case 
studies and present the results and assess the importance of SE activities in those case 
studies. Chapter 5 will then evaluate the framework and identify any possible 
improvements and conclude with a tailored SE model for rapid development projects 
conducted under AFRL‟s Core Process 3. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Current DoD Acquisition and Rapid Reaction Efforts 
 
Formal Department of Defense acquisition processes and organizations have been 
slow and unresponsive to initial requests to counter the IED threat (DSB, 2009). The 
acquisition model currently used by the Department of Defense is based on three highly 
interrelated and complex processes to deliver weapon systems to our armed forces as 
outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook- see Figure 1. The Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process identifies gaps in current warfighter 
capabilities and proposes solutions to fill those gaps. The Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process makes the monetary and programmatic 
investments based on the prioritized list of gaps and solutions determined by the JCIDS 
process. The Defense Acquisition System executes programs based on the funding they 
receive to deliver a product to the warfighter.  
The funding generally operates on a two year cycle and justification to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff is generally required to make any major changes to the plan. The gaps 
discovered by the JCIDS process are initiated by requirements from the operational user 
who perceives a shortfall in capability of the equipment developed and procured for them. 
During wartime, solutions are needed much quicker than starting in the next two-year 
cycle. In response, many ad hoc organizations have sprung up and established 
organizations have developed new processes to meet the thousands of requirements, Joint 
and Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs and UONs) as defined in CJCS Instruction 
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3470.01, coming from combatant commanders. Figure 2 displays some of these 
organizations.  
 
Figure 1: DoD Decision Support System (DAG, Ch1) 
 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense has established the Joint Rapid 
Acquisition Cell (JRAC) to be the focal point for responding to JUONs. To manage 
COCOM requests that need a timely response, the DoD has created a subset of JUONs 
called Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs). These requests are designated by the JRAC as 
needing a material or logistic solution within 120 days. The JRAC then works with the 
appropriate service or organization to find a solution within 120 days, which if approved is 
delivered to the COCOM.  
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Figure 2: DoD Rapid Reaction Organizations (DSB, Urgent Needs, 2009) 
 
 
The Air Force has established its own Rapid Response Process as codified in AFI 
63-114. While oriented towards Air Force UONs, it has the capability to respond to JUONs 
if the solution resides within the Air Force Space and Missile System Center (AFSPC), the 
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) or the 
Program Executive Officers. The process starts with a COCOM submitting a UON to the 
lead MAJCOM (ACC, AMC, AFSOC, or AFSPC) which has the mission or capability 
shortfall addressed by the UON. A Combat Capability Document (CDD) may then be 
delivered to Headquarters Air Force for approval. This initiates the Rapid Response 
Process (RRP) which then reviews the CCD based on a set of criteria that includes 
timeliness of the solution, need of the capability to address the shortfall, whether the 
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capability is “operationally safe, suitable and effective, supportive, sustainable, affordable 
with the support infrastructure already in place,” do not require RDT&E to field and that 
the CCD has addressed Mishap Prevention per AFI 91-202. If the CCD is approved 
without issues, HQAF is notified and the solution is implemented. If the CCD does not 
meet the RRP criteria, the lead MAJCOM may submit their request through the JCIDS 
process.  
This emphasis on potentially lengthy upfront analysis and preparation has created a 
deterrent to pursue the RRP and incentive to find other means of answering the J/UONs. As 
described in CJCSI 3470.01 which addresses how JUONs are validated and funded,  
In most cases, the lead MAJCOM satisfies the combatant 
commander‟s urgent need through means other than the CCD process 
(non-materiel solution, internal programming authority, off-the-shelf 
purchase, etc.). This is the preferred method as it provides the quickest 
support to the warfighter. 
In addition to the above instruction, recent discussions with HQ AFMC staff members 
validated the above statement by noting that no CCD has been written in the past year for 
submittal to the RRP. 
It has been the personal experience of this author that in addition to the formal top-
down flow of urgent needs, J/UONs are also created in a grassroots fashion. J/UONs are 
sometimes the product of warfighters connecting directly with product centers and 
technology experts. Once the need is expressed and a solution found, the J/UON is drafted 
and submitted through the formal channels and the solution is presented to the decision 
makers as an option. While not officially endorsed, it does have the benefit on reducing the 
time in discovering a solution.   
 
11 
AFRL has recently formalized a process to respond directly to urgent warfighter 
needs. To understand it in context an overview of AFRL is warranted. The official mission 
of AFRL is to discover, develop and deliver technology for insertion into the fighting force. 
It accomplishes this mission by three Core Processes. Core Process 1 (CP1) focuses on 
discovery and invests in basic research that the Air Force has determined will be needed to 
maintain superiority. Core Process 2 (CP2) matures and demonstrates applied research 
technologies that show potential for insertion into the inventory. Core Process 3 (CP3) has 
been established to meet urgent needs by providing direct communication between a Major 
Command (MAJCOM) or Combatant Command (COCOM) and the Lab to develop and 
demonstrate a solution within one year.  
 
Figure 3: AFRL Core Processes (AFRL Overview, Lab 101) 
 
 
A Core Process 3 project is loosely defined as capability that is intended to be 
fielded within two years. The project can either be initiated in two ways. “Technology 
push” efforts are considered by the AFRL Corporate Board and funded based on the 
perceived benefits of the proposed solution. “Requirements pull” projects allow a 
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MAJCOM or COCOM to directly request AFRL funding of solutions to urgent needs. 
Figure 4 illustrates that process. 
 
 
Figure 4: CP3 Requirements Pull Flowchart (CP3 Innovation and Collaboration, Lab 101) 
 
 
Once the user has identified the need the request is communicated by the 
MAJCOM leadership (usually the first general officer in the user‟s chain). The request is 
sent to the AFRL commander for review and tags the request as a CP3 project. A 1-3 
month study will define the problem as defined by the user, identify potential solutions and 
defines the timeline, cost and manning required to meet the request. The project is then 
reviewed by the AFRL commander and if approved, executed according to the proposal. A 
demonstration of the capability is set for 7-12 months from the initial request and, if it 
meets the user‟s requirements, is fielded. During this year, transition leads and paths are 
identified if the project warrants inclusion into a program of record (POR). 
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Currently there is no guidance on how to manage a CP3 program any differently 
from any other project in the Lab. Program managers are usually chosen due to excelling 
performance on previous projects and are typically “hard chargers” found in most 
organizations. Projects usually take on the personality of the program manager, or PM. 
While a “get it done” attitude helps in completing the paperwork necessary to start and run 
a project, there may be “blind spots” that PMs are missing that lead to inefficiencies, 
rework or not meeting schedules that are, by nature of the organization, aggressive. This 
study seeks to discover any blind spots and provide recommendations to support the 
program manager. 
 
Prior Studies of Defense Rapid Development 
 
A recent Defense Science Board (DSB) study on Fulfilling Urgent Operational 
Needs cited eight studies in the past five years that propose changes that would create an 
agile, responsive process for the DoD to rapidly field solutions to urgent needs. The 
common theme was that the current acquisition model does not satisfy the timeline of 
developing solutions to urgent needs because it focuses on “micromanaging risk and 
achieving the 100 percent solution” (DSB, 2009). While it might be tempting to use this as 
justification to abandon systems engineering principles to reduce timelines and “get it 
faster”, this impulse should be resisted. The fact is technical solutions are required to be 
engineered to fit within the larger military toolkit. Solutions must not work only in a 
vacuum. 
The DSB also published a study establishing the Strategic Technology Vectors 
(DSB, 2007). A recommendation is made for a single Rapid Fielding Office to coordinate 
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all rapid reaction organizations. This call is later echoed by the DSB Task Force on 
Fulfilling Urgent Needs with the proposal of the Rapid Acquisition Fielding Agency (DSB, 
2009). One key recommendation in both reports is the use of systems engineering as a 
“cross-cutting enabler” that “manages the tradeoffs necessary to develop and field a system 
that is affordable, is sustainable, is delivered on schedule, satisfies user needs, and 
minimizes risk.” (DSB, 2007) 
The search, then, is to find the proper balance of SE practices implemented in a 
rapid reaction project. Two recent studies have independently addressed a tailored SE 
approach for AFRL and rapid development and acquisition. The 2009 AFIT thesis, “A 
Tailored Systems Engineering Framework for Science and Technology Projects,” 
addressed a perceived disconnect between the conceptual framework of SE and its actual 
implementation in research projects. It produced a SE tool based on six discriminates: 
budget category, budget size, core process, technology readiness level, level of integration, 
and requirements maturity (i.e. requirements push or tech pull). The output of the tool when 
applied to a particular project was a level of “SE rigor” which placed each technical and 
technical management process into one of the following categories: Required, 
Recommended, Watch List, Not Applicable. It follows that this tool could be applied to 
rapid reaction projects.  
In the 2008 AFIT thesis, “An Analysis of Methodologies and Best Practices for 
Rapidly Acquiring Technologies to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs”, Capt David Solomon 
studied the ways in which rapid reaction organizations foster innovation and how they 
utilize the “critical enablers” identified in the DSB Strategic Technology Vector study. As 
one of the enablers, systems engineering‟s perceived value varied across DoD rapid 
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reaction organizations. Some respondents viewed it as vital while others saw no value. 
Nevertheless, one recommendation for future study was to investigate the appropriate 
amount of systems engineering and determine a tailored approach for projects that answer 
an urgent need.  
Rapid Development Outside the Defense Department 
 
Rapid development outside the military encompasses a few different areas. The 
field of prototyping deals with manufacturing a test product quickly. While the goal of this 
study is to shorten the time to deliver products, rapid prototyping focuses on the specific 
assembly of the product based on a complete design. Therefore the scope of this inquiry 
will extend beyond rapid prototyping. The field of software development also offers many 
methods to deliver products quickly. The attributes of software development lend to short 
time cycles from product design and integration to test and typically go through numerous 
iterations before a final product is delivered. While many of the urgent needs of the military 
tend towards hardware solutions, the lesson of understanding a problem and developing a 
solution is common to both cases. Finally, there exist studies in business management 
literature on how to shorten the cycle of product development. While the focus of these 
studies is to be first to market and being responsive to shifting consumer trends in order to 
maximize profitability, the methods uncovered will also be applicable since the goal of a 
short product cycle is common to both. Also, being first to market in the military sense 
equates to an advantage in technology or tactics for which the enemy hasn‟t developed 
countermeasures.  
In 1991, James Martin wrote Rapid Application Development which sought to 
provide an alternative to “rigid” development methods, such as the waterfall method, to the 
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software development community (Howard, 2002). In 1995, a group of software 
developers in the UK teamed with end-user organizations to create the Rapid Application 
Development (RAD) standard (Millington and Stapleton, 1995). The goal of the standard 
was to be a framework for vendors to follow when writing software applications. They 
listed five phases in the development life cycle. The first two focused on business matters, 
namely a feasibility report and a business study. The third phase focused on “functional 
model iteration, producing a functional prototype, a statement of non-functional 
requirements and an implementation strategy”. Following this was a “design-and-build 
iteration” where the prototype was tested against requirements. The authors suggest three 
iterations between the third and forth phases “for initial investigation, refinement, and 
consolidation.” Finally the system is implemented with the users with manuals and 
training.  
While touted as a standard, RAD was more of a philosophy requiring autonomy 
and senior leader buy-in, experience and recognized talent among a stable team. In 2000, a 
case study was used to showcase RAD methods in an internal BT (formerly British 
Telecom) intranet project (Beynon-Davies, et al, 2000). In it, a matrixed team of employees 
was separated from their duty stations and tasked with building an internal on-line resource 
for their corporate relations department. In it the team delivers a working prototype in three 
weeks. While not being the final answer, the product allowed for future enhancement based 
on the potential of added requirements and was a complete product in that it met the 
requirements within the scope of the project.  
A group at BAE Systems, Advanced Technology Centre, took RAD one step 
further in aggregating Extreme Programming (one of the different flavors of agile software 
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development including RAD) and systems engineering (Jones and Leung, 2005). The 
objective was to build a wide area surveillance system that could be commercialized 
despite technical complexity. Their approach to the problem followed a three-point plan: 1) 
Define the CONOP to give a high level view of the system and provide scenarios for 
development and test. 2) Determine key questions in understanding the requirements. And 
3) Develop a prototype system based on technologically mature components. The case 
study documents the development of a prototype system that through iterations from an 
initial system, meets the performance parameters established at the beginning of the 
project. Key, in the authors‟ minds, was the understanding of the component technology 
and the requirements of the system, both individual performance requirements and an 
understanding of the scenarios in which it was to perform. 
In the world of business literature, a series of books written in the 1990s set the 
stage for companies to think about how they develop new products. In 1992, Wheelwright 
and Clark present “concepts for the effective organization and management of product and 
process development” in their book, Revolutionizing Product Development. Using case 
studies of Kodak, GE, Motorola and Lockheed they looked at project management 
frameworks in each company and identify five commonalities, namely “customer focus, 
discipline, coherence, fit and sharing the pattern.” Customer focus sought to understand the 
user‟s requirements but also their unmet needs. A contemporary case in the consumer 
electronics market would be Apple‟s success with the iPod. In the military sense, this can 
be seen as understanding the capability gap beyond what the user states as requirements. 
“What aspect of their mission is not being met that they don‟t know yet?” Discipline is 
geared towards a streamlined process that fosters “thoroughness and consistency” but 
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doesn‟t “stifle creativity” or slow down projects with unnecessary oversight. Coherence 
deals with assigning the right skills to projects not only in a technical sense but also a 
managerial approach. Fit with the mission ensures that the solutions of a project match the 
stated objectives; for example, technical solutions to solve technical problems rather than 
manufacturing or personnel issues. Finally, sharing the pattern looks at how organizations 
communicate a common framework and set expectations of “what must be done, when and 
how.” 
Focusing on the “discipline” aspect, Wheelwright and Clark devote Chapter 9 to 
“Tools and Methods” for executing projects. After proposing strategies for meeting 
performance goals and laying out effective plans, making sure the right people understand 
the right processes, the authors focus in on problem solving at the working level. Cross-
functional teams meeting with each other to “solve specific problems.” In their study, the 
ability to solve problems was at the heart of good product development. Their method for 
consistent, quality problem solving is broken down into the “design-build-test cycle”. 
Similar to the Vee Model in the Systems Engineering Handbook (INCOSE, 2003), 
Wheelwright and Clark‟s model is straightforward. In the design phase, requirements and 
tradeoffs are explored with clear objectives and alternative solutions are generated. The 
build phase then acts on those designs whether producing CAD models or test code or other 
engineering prototypes. The test phase then executes a test plan based on collecting the 
right information accurately in an environment as close as possible to the intended use 
environment. Wheelwright and Clark also encourage the use of iterations if the first cycle 
fails to meet the expected performance measures.  
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In 1993, in the second edition of his book, Winning at New Products: Accelerating 
the Process from Idea to Launch, Robert Cooper proposed Stage-Gates as a method to 
develop new products. Similar to the Defense acquisition milestones, Stage-Gates take an 
idea through a series of gates to determine if the idea is worth committing resources to go 
to the next stage. The five stages, being Preliminary Design, Business Case, Development, 
Testing and Validation, Full Product & Market Launch, all have entrance and exit criteria 
and allow a team to focus on each phase before proceeding to the next. One caution from 
the author is that it is intended that the process not focus on one functional area per stage, 
but rather use multi-functional teams to work in parallel through the stages. For instance, a 
test team member might have valuable insight on creating a testable specification during 
the preliminary design phase that will shorten test time down the road or a marketing team 
member may use validation results that would target key early adopters in winning early 
critiques of the product. Stage-Gates are not intended to be inflexible and companies are 
encouraged to tailor them to suit different project category needs. The process should 
enable teams to create the right product efficiently, not enable management to become 
roadblocks. 
For the purposes of this research, the reader should assume that the project idea has 
been identified, the business case has been pitched and management has agreed to initiate 
the project. This starts the project in Stage 3, Development. The first action Cooper 
suggests is to confirm the requirements. Bring users in to expose any incorrect assumptions 
or to re-prioritize the performance targets in case there were shifts in the marketplace 
(analogous to threats and capability gaps in the military). A development plan is then built 
with tasks listed, realistic timelines to complete and resources assigned. Additionally, 
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milestones throughout the project with definable goals for the development set targets that 
team members can agree on and plan activities accordingly. Throughout the development 
stage, in-house testing is iterative and customer involvement and feedback is essential in 
creating the right product. Cooper‟s Stage 4 encompasses preference tests (“do I like your 
product better than what I have”) and field trials (limited quantities or simulations to gauge 
user interest) are analogous to the DoD‟s operational testing. In each case, the product is 
tested in a relevant environment with representative users to validate the product and 
collect feedback before full-rate production. 
Five years later in 1998, the second edition of Preston Smith and Donald 
Reinersten‟s book, Developing Products in Half the Time: New Rules, New Tools was 
published. Smith and Reinertsen pick up on the ideas of the two prior authors and offer a 
few of new concepts such as the “fuzzy front end” which they define as the time from when 
an opportunity is discovered to when a development team begins work on the project. 
Some of this time is due to the bureaucratic nature of organizations but also includes 
factors such as expedited shipping costs that may be reduced if identified earlier in the 
project timeline. As an improvement to Cooper‟s Stage-Gate style of phased project 
planning, Smith and Reinertsen suggest product development organizations reduce the 
emphasis on the gates (i.e. less formal reviews) and more emphasis on the flow of the 
project. For example, management may decide exit criteria for each stage and let the team 
decide when they have met those criteria. Reports could be presented at quarterly reviews 
(or more frequent) to ensure projects don‟t run amok.  
In separate sections, Smith and Reinertsen address managing risk. In the first, 
technical risk is addressed by focusing risk mitigation within individual models of a design 
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versus distributing risk management broadly over the whole. System integration risk is 
reduced by focusing on the riskiest modules and the use of margins or safety factors for 
critical items such as fastener tolerances. In the second section (Chapter 12), the authors re-
address technical risk and compare its relation to market risk. Too much technical risk 
management, in the form of multiple reviews, can increase market risk by delaying a 
project introducing uncertainty into sales predictions. Of course, not enough technical risk 
management results in costly surprises late in the development cycle. Smith and Reinertsen 
suggest that it depends on the project goals and a moderate level of risk management leads 
to shorter development cycle times. To control risk, the authors offer a commonly used 
chart where the probability of an event (i.e. assembly of the engineering prototypes) is 
compared with the impact of it not happening (i.e. field tests slip 1 month) as shown in 
Table 2. Events that are likely to occur with a high impact on schedule, say, are identified 
as high risk. 
Table 2: Risk Analysis Table 
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
 
of
 R
isk
 High Impact 
   
Med Impact    
Low Impact    
  Low  Med High 
  Probability of Occurrence 
 
 
In 2007, Michael Grieves wrote Product Lifecycle Development based on his 
background in the automotive and IT industries. While not specifically focused on “rapid 
development”, Grieves notes that cycle times are an external driver pushed by customers 
and competition and provides examples of multiple industries that exhibit this phenomenon 
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from the automobile to fashion to pharmaceuticals. His describes the five functional areas 
of product lifecycles as “plan, design, build, support, dispose.” The planning consists of 
“requirements analysis and planning” which leads into the design phase where engineers 
play with trade-offs while ensuring the requirements are met. Prototypes are then built 
based on specifications that ensure the “various components fit together in an integrated 
system and that the system is internally consistent.” During the build phase, manufacturing 
engineers decide how the product is built and in what steps. Finally the support and 
disposal ensure feedback is attained from the customer and decisions are made concerning 
what to do with it after its use.  
Finally, the Product Development and Management Association (PDMA) has 
published a collection of tools “most appropriate for use in the engineering design and 
development phases” of new product development in The PDMA Toolbook 3 for New 
Product Development. Released in 2007, PDMA Toolbook covers multiple topics from 
trade-off analysis to intellectual property to development. Gregory Githens offers the 
Rolling Wave approach to development cycles. In traditional projects, a schedule is built 
and tasks are populated from beginning to end on the assumption that all actions required 
are “knowable” upfront. The Rolling Wave approach seeks to create a “robust‟ schedule 
that is flexible and overcomes “brittle schedules” that occur when early slips lead to 
“individuals [that] narrow their focus to their own subjective view of priorities”.  
The proposed solution seeks a “plan-do-plan-do” series of activities where 
segments of the project are broken up into “rough order magnitudes” or “ROMs”. Tasks 
are only planned out as the team reaches each ROM Group. The argument goes that task 
completion dates grow in uncertainty the farther away they are. Therefore, focusing on 
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short-term forecasts will produce more reliable estimates in the long run. Githens 
emphasizes that agility both in the product and project architecture. Product agility covers 
interface management and the use of common technical standards. Project agility concerns 
team composition, levels of authority, review and approval cycles, roles and 
responsibilities, risk and issues analysis, escalation strategy, etc.” Githens then offers six 
steps in executing a Rolling Wave approach as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Rolling Wave Methodology 
 
Step 1 starts with a team charter that captures the requirements management, team 
roles and responsibilities and lays out the vision of the project. Step 2 is creating a work 
breakdown structure (WBS) to include Level 1 and Level 2 activities. Level 1 will be 
segmented by the ROM Groups or “planning windows”. Tasks that are well understood 
and can be detailed to the work package level are documented in the WBS while less 
certain tasks, say specifications that require user feedback on prototypes, are left undefined 
and assigned to later planning windows. Step 3 details the tasks of the WBS for each and 
starts the “plan a little” stage. Cost and schedules are presented as range estimates that can 
be as little as half the target or as much as twice the target. This requires project managers 
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to gain the trust of stakeholders to allow the flexibility of this planning approach. 
Additionally, a transition plan should be formulated to prevent delays at the end of 
development and the beginning of product launch or delivery. Step 4 proposes managing 
risk and reprioritizing activities versus establishing a baseline and monitoring variance. 
Step 5 executes the first ROM Group or “do a little” with attention paid to monitoring risks 
and keeping key stakeholders up to date if cost or schedule variances break a 
predetermined threshold. Step 6 iterates the planning-doing cycles until completion. The 
key activities are assessing the groups‟ progress, anticipating tasks in future planning 
windows and ensuring the “big picture” is fixed in each team members‟ decision making 
processes.  
Summary 
 
This chapter presented an overview of rapid development efforts within the DoD, 
the USAF and AFRL. In addition it looked to industry for additional frameworks for rapid 
development. These and other methods from literature will be compiled and consolidated in 
Chapter 3. The common processes will be translated into the SE technical and technical 
management processes to take advantage of acquisition training required for certification in 
the acquisition career field. A purposive sampling of AFRL rapid development team 
members will identify the methods currently used in the CP3 organization.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods will be used to assess the relative 
importance of various processes and artifacts defined in Chapter 4, Systems Engineering, 
of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) with respect to rapid development projects. 
Terms referenced in the definitions of each process will be compared with those found in 
the literature and evaluated based on importance. A management strategy will then be 
proposed based on the relative importance of each process. A comparison with key 
activities identified by a purposive sampling of AFRL rapid development team members 
will provide an evaluation of the proposed strategy compared to recent projects. 
With origins in the product development community, methodologies such as Stage 
Gating, Product Lifecycle Management and Rapid Application Development offer 
strategies to apply to rapid development. Identifying key processes in these methods will be 
compared to the 8 technical and 8 technical management processes as defined in the DAG.  
Product Development Literature Evaluation 
 
Content analysis is a method that has origins in the 1940s and began with 
conducting word counts on texts. Eventually it matured to concepts and meanings. A 
conceptual analysis is a sub-category of content analysis where texts are examined for 
frequency of words or phrases related to a research question. In this study, product 
development texts will be examined for the frequency of SE keywords determined by this 
author from the DAG SE process definitions. The relative frequency of these keywords will 
provide insight as to what the authors deem important in instructing the reader how to do 
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product development. A listing of keywords for the technical management and technical 
processes can be found in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.  
Processes will be identified and assessed in each literature method based on their 
importance. Importance in this case will be equated with frequency. The number of 
references to keywords from the DAG SE process definitions will be normalized and 
assigned an importance score ranging from 1- Not Important to 5- Extremely Important as 
seen in Table 5. Keywords are listed in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The reader is referred 
to the DAG, Chapter 4, section 4.2.3, for complete definitions of each technical and 
technical management process.  
Table 3: Keywords of the Technical Management Processes 
 
Technical Management Process Keywords 
Decision Analysis  
(DA) 
Trade Studies, Analyses- Alternatives, Supportability, 
Cost, Trade Off 
Technical Planning  
(TP) 
Scope of Technical Effort, Systems Engineering Plan 
Technical Assessment  
(TA) 
Technical Review, Program Review, Technical 
Interchange, Interface Control Working Group 
Requirements Management 
(Req Mgmt) 
Requirements, Traceability, Change Management 
Risk Management Risk- Identification, Analysis, Mitigation, Tracking 
Configuration Management 
(Config Mgmt) 
Technical Baseline, Functional Baseline, Allocated 
Baseline, Product Baseline, Change Management, 
Audits 
Data Management Technical Data, Records, Organization, Sharing 
Interface Management  
(Int Mgmt) 
Interface Specifications, Standards, Compliance 
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Table 4: Keywords of the Technical Processes 
 
Technical Process Keywords 
Stakeholders Requirements  
Definition (SRD) 
Requirements, CONOPS, Constraints, Stakeholder 
Requirements Analysis 
(RA) 
Functional Analysis, Performance Requirements, 
Functional Architecture 
Architecture Design  
(AD) 
Design Solutions, Logical Models or Views, Physical 
Architecture, Specification 
Implementation (Imp) System Elements, Production, Component Testing 
Integration (Int) Assembly, Interfaces, Incorporation, Prototype 
Verification (Ver) Demonstration, Inspection, Analysis, Test 
Validation (Val) Validation, Evaluation 
Transition (Trans) Installation, Integration, Fielding 
 
Table 5: Importance Scale Descriptions 
 
Importance Scale Description 
0-1 Not Important 
1-2 Somewhat Important 
2-3 Important 
3-4 Very Important 
4-5 Extremely Important 
 
 
Proposed Framework 
 
A comparison of each method against the 16 system engineering processes 
endorsed by Chapter 4 of the DAG will highlight where emphasis has been given by the 
authors. Keywords will be counted for frequency within the books and texts to indicate 
importance and normalized to provide comparable values. Normalized scores are calculated 
by the equation: 
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Where Scorei is the number of keyword references from each author for a process, i, 
MAX(Scorei) is the maximum number of references from each author in a particular 
process and multiplied by 5 to fit the scale in Table 5. This will normalize the scores to 
show which is process is most emphasized which will be equated with most important. The 
scores for the technical management and the technical processes will be normalized 
separately since technical processes typically take place sequentially and technical 
management processes occur throughout the life of a project. Scores will then be totaled 
and calculated as a percentage to display relative weights to which program managers can 
allocate resources (time, money, and people).  
Purposive Sampling and Analysis 
 
This study will follow a similar methodology conducted by a recent INCOSE paper 
(Mulhearn and Brouse, 2011). In it, the authors investigate small information technology 
(IT) projects with the intent of filtering the most important documents to “effectively and 
efficiently manage the project”. Twelve knowledge areas were combined from ontologies 
from both the program management and systems engineering literature to encompass the 
technical emphasis of the IT projects. “Small” IT projects were defined as “under 12 
months in duration and cost less than $1.5M.” A survey sent to a purposive sampling of IT 
professionals identified the top 15% of documents and reviews. It is the intent of this 
review to conduct the same evaluation with AFRL program managers for rapid reaction 
projects. 
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Interviews with key personnel (program managers and chief engineers) on rapid 
development projects will provide an evaluation of the current emphasis placed on each 
process. Each process will be assessed by the author on a 1-5 scale of importance. The 
criteria are derived from SE technical process outputs as outlined in the INCOSE Systems 
Engineering Handbook, v3.1. These definitions were chosen over standard DoD 
Acquisition terminology to encompass activities that met the intent but weren‟t specifically 
defined by DoD terms. Some criteria were augmented by DoD Developmental and 
Operational Test activities where the INCOSE SE handbook provided insufficient 
measures to stratify the formality of a particular process (i.e. Verification and Validation). 
A listing of interview questions and topics is found in Appendix A. These scores will then 
be compared with the model determined by the product development literature. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
This chapter will present the results of the conceptual analysis of the product 
development literature with respect to DAG SE processes. From this analysis, an allocation 
of resources will be presented by looking at the relative scores of each process. The chapter 
will then present the results of the levels of formality of SE processes uncovered in the case 
studies. Finally, the two levels of importance will be compared with each other and 
analyzed. 
Results  
 
Tables 11 and 12 show the normalized scores of the SE processes found in each 
rapid development approach. Figures 6 and 7 display this data as bar charts, with the 
standard deviation computed for the error bars. Based on the data, the most important 
Technical Management processes for rapid development are Technical Planning, Decision 
Analysis, Risk Management and Technical Assessment. There is a general concurrence that 
Technical Planning is a must for product development as this process has the highest score 
with one of the smallest deviations. All other Technical Management data show a mixed 
emphasis for each of the other processes. Decision Analysis, Technical Assessment, Risk 
Management are slightly more emphasized while Requirements Management, 
Configuration Management and Data Management slightly less and Interface Management 
almost not at all.  
The most important Technical Processes are Stakeholder Requirements Definition, 
Architecture Design and Integration. There is a concurrence that Stakeholder Requirements 
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Definition is emphasized heavily while Architecture Design, Integration and Verification 
are emphasized slightly more and Validation slightly less. Requirements Analysis, 
Implementation and Transition received low scores having not been emphasized in the 
texts. 
Table 6: SE Technical Management Process Scores 
 
Technical 
Management 
Processes 
DA TP TA Req 
Mgt 
Risk 
Mgt 
Config 
Mgt 
Data 
Mgt 
I/F 
Mgt 
Wheelright 
and Clark  
2.50 5.00 1.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cooper/ Stage 
Gates 
4.17 5.00 3.33 0.00 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Smith and 
Reinertsen 
2.14 5.00 1.43 1.43 5.00 1.43 1.43 0.71 
PLD 1.25 3.75 0.00 1.25 0.00 3.75 5.00 0.00 
RAD 1.67 5.00 1.67 3.33 1.67 3.33 3.33 0.00 
PDMA 4.38 4.38 5.00 0.63 3.13 0.63 0.63 0.63 
AVERAGE 2.68 4.69 2.15 1.19 2.35 1.52 1.73 0.22 
St Dev 1.30 0.52 1.75 1.17 1.81 1.65 2.03 0.35 
 
 
Table 7: SE Technical Process Scores 
 
Technical 
Processes 
SRD RA AD Imp Int Ver Val Tran
s 
Wheelright 
and Clark  
5.00 1.67 3.33 1.67 2.92 2.50 2.50 0.00 
Cooper/ Stage 
Gates 
5.00 0.56 1.67 0.56 1.11 2.22 1.67 1.11 
Smith and 
Reinertsen 
2.22 1.11 5.00 0.00 1.67 0.56 0.00 0.56 
PLD 3.75 1.25 3.75 0.00 5.00 2.50 1.25 0.00 
RAD 5.00 1.67 1.67 0.00 1.67 3.33 1.67 0.83 
PDMA 5.00 0.34 0.86 0.17 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.52 
Average 4.33 1.10 2.71 0.40 2.12 1.91 1.24 0.50 
St Dev 1.15 0.55 1.57 0.66 1.64 1.19 0.93 0.44 
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Figure 6: Technical Management Process Scores with Standard Deviation Error 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Technical Process Scores with Standard Deviation Error 
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Analysis 
 
From the emphasis the literature places on the technical management processes, the 
project manager must first manage the scope and develop the technical plan for achieving 
the project objectives. This is a logical conclusion since vague requirements or a lack of 
technical direction can lead to miscommunication or mismanaged expectations which can 
lead to rework or product rejection. This does not mean that the initial scope or technical 
plan must change, rather that the project manager must manage how potential changes 
affect the development of the end product. Once the technical planning process is in place, 
the project manager must support it with Decision Analysis, Technical Assessments and 
Risk Management. In other words, to direct the technical effort a project manager must 
understand the performance and cost trade-offs of different approaches, assess the progress 
throughout the development and have a robust risk management procedure- identify, 
assess, mitigate, track- to deal with problems before they come to bear. Requirements 
Management, Configuration Management, Data Management and Interface Management 
are all things a project manager should be mindful of, however, they should not take a 
majority of his/her time and resources. 
The Technical Management scores generally follow the “Design- Build- Test 
Cycle” put forward by Wheelright and Clark. Stakeholder Requirements Definition was 
clearly the most important which is logical since new products are developed to meet a 
need, whether a perceived need in the commercial industry or a stated need in the defense 
acquisition system. A project manager must understand how the new product is intended to 
perform, in what environment, how it interacts with other systems and so on. Architecture 
Design followed next with a physical solution to meet the requirements. Having CAD 
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models and logical views, such as the DoDAF Architecture, ensures that the team is “on the 
same page” for designing the system. Integration and Verification were next in importance 
showing that it is important to put the components together correctly and test the system to 
ensure it was built right.  
The lower Technical Management process scores could be explained as an outcome 
of focusing on the higher scored processes. For example, if a project clearly defines the 
outputs of the Stakeholder Requirements Definition process- namely the CONOPS, 
environment, constraints as stated by all the stakeholders- the Validation testing should be 
easier and thus less emphasized. If the Architecture Design is correct, then the 
Implementation of building the components to the design specifications should be well 
understood and less emphasized. If the right product is built correctly, then Transition 
should follow without major problems. The score for Requirements Analysis however 
seems out of place. This result could be explained by its dependence on a successful 
Stakeholder Requirements Definition phase, but it is also conceivable that the keywords 
chosen were an inaccurate measure of the process or that the keywords exist primarily 
within the systems engineering community or specific to DoD SE that the authors of the 
texts under study did not use this terminology.  
By converting the scores to an overall percentage, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, a 
program manager can weigh each process relative to the other and plan out a project. Since 
these are process resource allocations it makes more sense to apply these percentages to the 
management of a project and not the overall budget, which could include high-cost items. It 
can be helpful to think of applying the percentages to the time allotted during regular 
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meetings or hours in a week that a project manager focuses his/her time directing the 
project. 
 
 
Figure 8: Technical Management Process Resource Allocation 
 
 
Figure 9: Technical Process Resource Allocation 
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One concept not captured in evaluating the different processes was iteration. Most 
of the texts cited process iteration as a key strategy in product development. Once a design 
is created, it is presented to the stakeholders for feedback and refinement. This could 
happen multiple times but the Rapid Application Development team suggests at least three 
iterations. The inability of this evaluation to capture the importance of design iteration 
could give program managers a false impression that a single pass development strategy 
using the above resource allocations will produce a successful product. A more successful 
strategy is to integrate the user into the development team providing constant feedback as 
the product grows from requirements to specifications to assembly and test. 
Key Activities Identified by AFRL Rapid Reaction Team Members 
 
A purposive sampling was conducted between AFRL Scientist and Engineer (S&E) 
employees that have participated in Core Process 3 (CP3) projects. Individual interviews 
sought to establish a baseline of common practices for project managers. The interviews 
were conducted among engineers and program managers with 2-6 years of experience in 
AFRL rapid development with projects ranging from 6 months to 3 years in schedule and 
$500,000 to $12M in budget. Backgrounds ranged from prior military service to active duty 
to career civilian with positions in and outside of AFRL. Team sizes for their rapid 
development projects ranged from 3 to 12 people.  
For each technical and technical management process, a common set of products 
(i.e. work breakdown structure, integrated master plan, team charter, key resources for 
Technical Planning) was evaluated for whether the subject fully, partially or did not 
accomplish during their projects. (A full list of the common products can be found in 
Appendix A.) The author infers from this assessment that the effort put to creating (or not 
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creating) these products reflects a level of importance the subject placed on each technical 
and technical management process. These scores will be compared with the literature 
review scores and analyzed in Chapter 5. 
Figures 10 and 11 show the results from the interviews. The scores are on the same 
scale of level of importance (1 to 5) and reflect what project managers have done. The 
technical process scores at first glance do not present any “smoking guns”. Architecture 
Design and Implementation show slightly higher scores while Verification, Validation and 
Transition show slightly lower. Since rapid development projects are by nature short on 
schedule, little slack is built in and thus an emphasis on doing more up front is displayed in 
the data. Subjects noted using engineering standards and monitoring progress to identify 
opportunities as ways to stay within short timelines.  
 
Figure 10: AFRL Rapid Development Technical Process Scores 
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Figure 11: AFRL Rapid Development Technical Management Scores 
 
The technical management processes, however, show greater variability. Decision 
Analysis, Technical Planning, Technical Assessments and Data Management all have 
higher scores than Requirements, Risk, Configuration and Interface Management. During 
interviews, it was commented that rapid development projects require strong leadership, 
delegation to the most competent team members, and emphasizing sharing information 
over documentation as successful strategies during rapid development projects. These 
themes reflect the first three processes listed. The last process, Data Management, may 
have scored higher due to the complex technical nature of the projects.  
Many interviewees had comments that could not be captured by the survey on how 
they do rapid development. The following statements were from individuals and not 
themes expressed by multiple people. One interviewee likened rapid development to a 
“jazz [band], not an orchestra.” Another noted that he would have more “Interim Program 
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was performing at a sufficient level. His advice on time management was to “identify the 
most critical risks” to the project weekly and mitigate during hour-long conference calls 
and that rapid development “required strong leadership.” The smaller risks were often left 
to individual team members, allowing the more senior team members to focus on the hard 
problems. Another interviewee said he didn‟t receive enough training on risk management 
when applied to rapid development. One suggested that you don‟t use Microsoft Project 
and that schedules don‟t show activities finer than one week.  
One interviewee felt the current project milestones weren‟t chosen without 
monitoring a project, but rather were held based on the initial schedule. He felt that reviews 
were being held to catch problems and that issues “should be caught before test reviews”. 
When applied to software, he felt that rapid development didn‟t afford time to check bugs 
in code written by geographically separated programmers, that there “wasn‟t time for QA 
[quality control]. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
 
 
Overview 
 
This study set out to identify key processes within the Department of Defense 
Systems Engineering framework that were of importance to rapid development projects 
within AFRL. A content analysis of product development literature, where industry strives 
to be the first to market a quality product, was performed across six different sources 
representing various communities in product development- academia, consultancy, 
software, trade association- and across 15 years of research. The frequency of keywords 
derived from the DAG definitions of each project was used to infer an importance 
emphasized by each of the texts. By computing a relative score on a scale of 1 to 5, certain 
processes were shown to be more important in product development. Technical Planning 
stood out as the most important Technical Management process followed by Decision 
Analysis, Technical Assessment and Risk Management. Stakeholders Requirements 
definition showed to be the most important Technical Process with Architecture Design, 
Integration and Verification  
A purposive sampling of AFRL S&E employees was conducted to evaluate the 
current implementation of SE processes within rapid development projects. Interviewees 
were asked to describe their approach to projects they had participated in or led. The author 
evaluated their responses with a numerical score based on how fully different SE products 
were created and thus their importance inferred. While the technical processes showed 
relatively similar results, Architecture Design and Implementation were scored slightly 
higher. This has been attributed to the short schedules of rapid development forcing more 
 
41 
emphasis “up front”. Technical management processes that scored higher included 
Decision Analysis, Technical Planning and Assessment, and Data Management. The theme 
here is that a strong decision making framework (or strong leadership) is useful to keep 
skilled teams on schedule during technically complex projects. 
When combined, the content analysis and purposive sampling offer an interesting 
comparison. Figures 12 and 13 show both sets of scores for the SE processes. First, we‟ll 
examine the technical process scores. While both sets of data agree that Architecture 
Design is important, the literature does not emphasize Requirements Analysis (RA) nor 
Implementation to the same degree that the AFRL S&E‟s place importance on those 
processes. The literature does, however, place a large emphasis on Stakeholders 
Requirements‟ Definition.  
 
Figure 12: Combined Technical Process Scores 
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Since RA is derived from the initial requirements, it may be that the literature 
leaves it to the reader to perform the engineering activities to go from requirements to 
design and does not devote as much time to explaining that effort. However, for AFRL 
S&E‟s it is an important piece of the design process to ensure stakeholders‟ concerns are 
matched to performance specifications. Implementation consists of designing and testing 
the subsystems and components. This being an internal process that feeds into the final, 
assembled product, the literature may place little emphasis compared to other processes. 
AFRL S&E‟s noted that constructing a prototype to show a user early and quickly was a 
key step that allowed feedback to modify design or requirements.  
The literature also shows little emphasis on transition compared to AFRL S&E‟s. 
This could be an assumption in the literature that if you research, design, build and test 
successfully consumers will buy your product. In the Lab, product transition is less of a 
guarantee and subject to separate acquisition organizations that require advocacy and 
funding above that required for the rapid development project. The remainder process 
scores are comparable to each other. 
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Figure 13: Combined Technical Management Process Scores 
Next, we will examine the technical management process scores. The main 
discrepancies are in Technical Planning and Interface Management. The literature places 
the most emphasis in determining the scope of the technical effort and developing a 
systems engineering plan to cover all aspects of a project. However, many of the 
interviewees attested that iterating on a design with feedback from the user was more 
important than developing a “fire-proof” plan. Interface Management was emphasized 
more among AFRL S&E‟s than in the literature. This could be due to the integrated nature 
of defense products especially with sensor technologies that are designed to push 
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a portable CD player or assumes that the external interfaces exist and are well defined like 
the USB ports on your personal computer and thus assigns it relatively little importance. 
To summarize the technical process scores, the literature and AFRL S&Es agreed 
to the general principle of “up-front and early” when conducting rapid development. The 
literature emphasized Stakeholders Requirements Development and Architecture Design. 
The S&Es were more uniform in their results and agreed on the importance of Architecture 
Design but also emphasized Implementation. The technical management processes were 
also generally similar, but the literature showed Technical Planning was of stronger 
importance and Interface Management of lesser importance when compared to the AFRL 
S&E scores.  
A possible explanation for differences in both analyses is the “practitioner vs. 
pundit” effect. With respect to the “pundits”, the content analysis of the literature has 
shown a strong preference for one process over another, in this case Tech Planning vs 
Interface Management. The authors may be assuming a level of understanding within their 
intended audience that masks the relative importance of each process. They could also 
overemphasize processes that either were ignored in the past or were executed poorly. 
From the point of view of the “practitioner” there may be a stronger emphasis on the 
processes that are requirements due to policy or practicality. Most of the technical process 
scores cluster around 2.75, with a score of 3 meaning the process was “important” vice 
“very important” or “not important” and the activities within the process were neither fully 
implemented nor fully ignored. In this study, the literature deems Implementation as “not 
important”. This contrasts with the AFRL engineers which score it as “important”. In 
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reality, a project must implement the design, otherwise there would be no product to test or 
deliver. 
Conclusions 
 
This study set out to determine if there were key Systems Engineering Processes 
emphasized by product development literature that could be implemented within AFRL 
rapid development projects. From the literature, Stakeholders Requirements Definition, 
Architecture Design and Technical Planning were strongly emphasized when compared to 
the other processes. This agrees with the anecdotal lesson learned “plan up front and early”. 
While interviewees agreed that up-front technical planning was important to maintaining 
short schedules, progress in delivering a prototype iterating the design based on user 
feedback was as important. Based on these results, project managers and chief engineers 
participating in future AFRL CP3 and other rapid development projects should focus on 
these processes early on in the projects‟ lifecycle. Senior leaders should encourage training 
in developing project requirements, architectures and holding meaningful reviews.  
Recommendations and Areas of Future Research 
  
The framework developed in this study could serve as a guide for program 
managers of rapid development projects. AFRL‟s Core Process 3 teams could be made 
aware of the findings codified by modifying the current AFRL instruction for CP3 or as an 
accompanying AFRL Manual.  
The outcome of the importance of the SE processes was highly dependent on the 
materials chosen. The methodology can be implemented further by including more product 
development literature or by focusing on a particular field (i.e. software development) and 
comparing to case studies within that field. 
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This research was conducted to follow up previous studies of rapid development 
within AFRL and the AFIT theses of Capt David Solomon and Majors Behm, Pitzer and 
White should also be consulted for additional topics. 
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APPENDIX B: LITERATURE SCORES 
Raw Scores (frequency count) 
 
 
Normalized Scores 
 
 
Stakeholders 
Requirements 
Definition
Requirements 
Analysis Arch Design Implementation Integration Verification Validation Transition Totals
Wheelright and Clark 12 4 8 4 7 6 6 0 47
Cooper/ Stage Gates 9 1 3 1 2 4 3 2 25
Smith and Reinertsen 4 2 9 0 3 1 0 1 20
PLM 3 1 3 0 4 2 1 0 14
RAD- Total 6 2 2 0 2 4 2 1 19
RAD- Standard, 1995 3 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 11
RAD- Implemented, 2000 3 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 8
PDMA 12 2 5 1 2 2 2 3 29
Handbook 2, 2005 11 1 4 0 1 1 1 2 21
Toolbook 3, 2007 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Decision Analysis
Technical 
Planning
Technical 
Assessment
Requirements 
Management Risk Mgmt Config Mgmt Tech Data Mgmt Interface Mgmt
Wheelright and Clark 5 10 3 1 2 0 0 0 21
Cooper/ Stage Gates 5 6 4 0 4 0 0 0 19
Smith and Reinertsen 3 7 2 2 7 2 2 1 26
PLM 1 3 0 1 0 3 4 0 12
RAD- Total 1 3 1 2 1 2 2 0 12
RAD- Standard, 1995 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 6
RAD- Implemented, 2000 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 6
PDMA 7 7 8 1 5 1 1 1 31
Handbook 2, 2005 6 6 7 0 4 0 0 0 23
Toolbook 3, 2007 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Technical Processes SRD RA AD Imp Int Ver Val Trans
Wheelright and Clark 5.00 1.67 3.33 1.67 2.92 2.50 2.50 0.00
Cooper/ Stage Gates 5.00 0.56 1.67 0.56 1.11 2.22 1.67 1.11
Smith and Reinertsen 2.22 1.11 5.00 0.00 1.67 0.56 0.00 0.56
PLM 3.75 1.25 3.75 0.00 5.00 2.50 1.25 0.00
RAD 5.00 1.67 1.67 0.00 1.67 3.33 1.67 0.83
PDMA 5.00 0.34 0.86 0.17 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.52
Average 4.33 1.10 2.71 0.40 2.12 1.91 1.24 0.50
St Dev 1.15 0.55 1.57 0.66 1.64 1.19 0.93 0.44
Percent of Total 30.3% 7.7% 19.0% 2.8% 14.8% 13.3% 8.7% 3.5%
Percent St Dev 22.93% 11.07% 31.38% 13.15% 32.87% 23.84% 18.53% 8.89%
Technical 
Management 
Processes DA TP TA Req Mgmt Risk Mgmt Config Mgmt Data Mgmt Int Mgmt
Wheelright and Clark 2.50 5.00 1.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cooper/ Stage Gates 4.17 5.00 3.33 0.00 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
Smith and Reinertsen 2.14 5.00 1.43 1.43 5.00 1.43 1.43 0.71
PLM 1.25 3.75 0.00 1.25 0.00 3.75 5.00 0.00
RAD 1.67 5.00 1.67 3.33 1.67 3.33 3.33 0.00
PDMA 4.38 4.38 5.00 0.63 3.13 0.63 0.63 0.63
AVERAGE 2.68 4.69 2.15 1.19 2.35 1.52 1.73 0.22
St Dev 1.30 0.52 1.75 1.17 1.81 1.65 2.03 0.35
Percent of Total 16.2% 28.3% 13.0% 7.2% 14.2% 9.2% 10.5% 1.3%
Percent St Dev 26.04% 10.46% 35.01% 23.44% 36.22% 33.10% 40.56% 6.94%
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APPENDIX C: SME SCORES 
 
Background Data 
 
Technical Process Scores 
 
 
Technical Management Scores 
 
 
 
 
ID Yrs RD Exp
Min Sched 
(years)
Max Sched 
(years)
Min Budget 
($'000)
Max Budget 
($'000)
Min 
Team Size
Max 
Team Size
1 6 0.5 3 500 3000 1 10
2 5 0.5 2 500 1000 3 12
3 2 2 2 70000 70000 90 90
4 2 0.5 1.5 500 2000 6 12
5 3 1 1.5 600 1000 3 6
6 2 1 2 20000 100000 20 50
7 3 0.5 2 500 2000 5 12
ID SRD RA AD Imp Int Ver Val Trans
1 3.40 3.50 2.50 3.00 3.50 1.00 1.00 2.33
2 4.00 4.00 4.33 4.75 2.00 2.00 1.67 1.00
3 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.50 3.00 5.00 3.00
4 1.50 2.33 3.67 3.00 3.50 3.00 3.00 3.00
5 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.33 3.00
6 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 4.50 5.00 4.00 4.20
7 1.67 1.50 4.00 3.67 3.67 3.67 2.00 1.00
ID DA TP TA
Req 
Mgmt
Risk 
Mgmt
Config 
Mgmt
Data 
Mgmt
Int 
Mgmt
1 3.25 2.00 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
2 3.00 4.40 2.33 1.67 2.00 1.00 4.00 3.00
3 2.60 2.60 2.20 2.33 2.50 2.20 4.00 2.00
4 4.00 3.40 3.00 1.67 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.00
5 3.50 2.50 2.67 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
6 3.00 4.33 5.00 2.33 5.00 3.00 4.00 3.00
7 1.80 1.00 2.60 1.00 1.00 2.20 3.00 5.00
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